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NOTE AND COMMENT
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw-APPI.ICABII.ITY OF FmsT TEN AMENDMENTS To UNINCORPORAT:Jm TERRITORY-A man was killed aboard an American ship in a
Virgin Island port. A police investigation was started the next day and continued for twelve days thereafter, during which twenty three witnesses were
examined by the government. During most of the investigation the prison, ers were present, and most of the testimony was translated into Spanish for
their benefit, that being the only language they understood. No formal charge
had been made against them and they were without counsel, but they were
given an opportunity to "explain" after the testimony of each witness. The
record was then transferred to the District court where the same judge presided, assisted by four lay judges. Formal charge was made, and the prisoners had counsel, The trial consisted of arguments on the facts as found in
the above investigation, no more witnesses being called, although the prisoners were given the opportunity of calling witnesses in their behalf. They
were found guilty. Act of Congress of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. c. 171) provided that, as to judicial proceedings, the local laws should continue in effect
"in so far as compatible with the cliang<:d sovereignty," until Congress should
othenvise provide. It was assumed that the above proceedings were in accord ·
with the "local laws" as established by Denmark. Held, the prisoners are
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entitled to a new trial, for the new sovereignty gives them the right to be confronted by the witnesses against them, and to be heard through cross-examination. Soto v. U.S., (C. C. A., 3d Circ., 1921), 273 Fed. 628.
As the new sovereign of the Virgin Islands is our Federal Government,
and as that Government must look to th~ Constitution for all its power, the
phrase "in so far as compatible with the changed sovereignty" should mean
in so far as not in conflict with the Constitution.
Since the war with Spain the determination of the legal status of our
outlying territories and the inhabitants thereof has been a difficult problem,
and a solution satisfactory from the view point of certainty has not been
reached. The actual decisions by the Supreme Court are few in number, and
narrow in scope, and have been by a court divided four against five. While
the statements of principles in these cases have covered the whole field of
territorial government ·and private rights thereunder very thoroughly, no one
theory has had the sanction of•a majority of the court.
'
As the law now stands, excepting from consideration foreign territory
temporarily occupied and territory taken for consular jurisdiction, the authority of the federal government extends over three classes of territory, namely,
states, incorporated territory, and unincorporated territory. The Constitution
is operative over the whole, in so far as its provisions are applicable. All are
applicable to the states. All are applicable to incorporated territory, except
those which by their nature can pertain to states only. As to what provisions are applicable to unincorporated territory, no general statement
can be made with any assurance of accuracy. Such territory is not foreign
territory in an international sense. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. l. It
is foreign territory in a domestic sense, for instance, within the meaning of the revenue clauses of the Constitution. Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U. S. 244 Indictment by a grand jury and verdict by unanimous vote
of twelve petit jurors are not necessary parts of a valid criminal trial in
unincorporated territory. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. 197; Dorr v. U. S.,
195 U. S. 138: Actual decisions carry us no further. Kepner v. U. S., 195
U. S. 100, adds nothing, for while it holds that the accused in the Philippines
cannot be subjected to double jeopardy, Congress had specifically provided
such guarantee by statute for that territory. Act of July l, 1902 (32 Stat.
6g1). The fact that Congress has given the Philippines and Hawaii bills of
rights containiI~g nearly all the provisions of the first ten amendments to the
Constitution, explains, perhaps, why the Supreme Court has not been called ,
upon more frequently to decide just which of these provisions are applicable
in the absence of such act of Congress, to unincorporated territory. At any
rate, actual decisions have not gone far in determining which provisions of
the first ten amendments are applicable to unincorporated territory, and which
are not.
If we turn, for a basis of division of these provisions, from authority to
the principles and theories set forth by the various members of the court in
the Insular Cases, we are met with a sharp conflict of views. The theory of
Mr. Justice Brown that the Constitution is operative in a given territory only
·when specifically "extended" to that territory by Congress, Rassmussen v. U.
S., 197 U. S. 516, has met with but little approval. The theory which had the
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sanction of more members of the court than any other was that all territory
should be lumped together and that all the provisions of the Constitution
should be applicable to all territory, except those provisions which could pertain to the states alone. The justices responsible for this proposition, however, were in the minority as to the actual decisions. Their theory seems
necessary neither as a matter of logic nor upon authority, and from the
view point of expediency would hardly be workable. The doctrine which is
the basis of the decision in the instant case, namely, that certain provisions
of the bill of rights are remedial or procedural only, and can be dispensed
with in unincorporated territory, while other provisions guarantee rights
that are fundamental, or natural, and cannot be denied anywhere under our
flag, it is submitted, really dodges the difficulty. For instance, which of the
rights stated in the Sixth Amendment are fundamental, or natural, and which
remedial only? The doctrine sounds well, but it is likewise unworkable.
Under another test suggested in the Insular Cases it is very doubtful if
the principal case could be sustained. Under this theory only those provisions
of the first eight amendments are applicable to unincorporated territory which
are in terms a prohibition upon the body which must act in order to deny
the right, to so act. This test has the merit of greater certainty. The difference between "Congress shall pass no law" in the First Amendment, and
"the accused shall enjoy'' in the Sixth, is clear cut. To adopt this doctrine
does not mean that, as a matter of constitutional law, the inhabitants of unincorporated territory could have none of the rights which by this test are
found to be inapplicable to such territory. It simply means that Congress
would be unfettered in its administration of such territory, except in so far
as it is expressly prohibited from denying certain rights. True, this would
permit Congress to withhold from such territory certain rights which in the
states are highly valued, but government of new territory means meeting new
conditions, and some measure of discretion is necessary for success. Congressional government of our territories has never tended to tyranny. Illustrations of this fact are to be found from the time of the adoption of the
Constitution to the present day, including the Act of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat.
c. 171) providing for the temporary government of the Virgin Islands. The
bill of rights given the Philippines, Act of July l, 1902 (32 Stat. 6g1) is convincing evidence of the policy of Congress to grant to the people of our unincorporated territories every right or safeguard they are prepared to receive
and wisely use. As was said by Holmes, J., in Kepner v. U. S., supra, the
danger now is that criminals will escape justice, not that they will be subjected
to tyranny. Admittedly, the Virgin Islands are unincorporated territory.
Admittedly, also, the decision of the instant case may unsettle the public
mind there, and interfere with the administration of justice, coming as it
does before the people are prepared for the change. The situation here is
very,.nearly the same as that involved in Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197,
where the result of invalidating the customary criminal procedure was carefully considered-and avoided. It is submitted that the decision of the
instant case could likewise have been avoided, upon sound principles, as outlined above, and without conflict with any previous authority.
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For further authorities upon the subject in general, see Fourteen Diamond
Rings v. U. S., 183 U. S. 176; Dooley v. U. S., 182 U. S. 222; 4r Am. L. Rev.
239; Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional La1.1:., 14g-157; Willoughby, Constitutional Law, Ch. 24, 25, 29 and 30.
D. H. B.
DtCI.ARATORY ]UDGMtNT-DtCI.ARING RIGHTS UNDER THE GUIS!> OF GRANTING AN INJUNCTION-It has often been held that a party may obtain a judicial
determination of his rights in respect to legislation alleged to be invalid, by
means of an application to a court of equity for an injunction restraining the
enforcement of the statute. Ex parte Ymmg (1907) 209 U. S. 123, is the
leading case of this type. There, a railroad rate statute was involved, which
required compliance by all railroad companies in the state, under the threat
of heavy penalties. The railroad actually violated the provisions of the
statute after an injunction had been obtained by a stockholder restraining
the company from complying, and prosecution for the violation was prevented
by an injunction against the attorney general. The latter injunction, it must
be noted, was an effective and appropriate ordei·, because acts of violation
were in fact taking place which would otherwise have called forth action by
the attorney general. The injunction could not, therefore, be looked upon as
anything but a genuinely operative remedy. Trttax v. Raich. (1915) 239 U. S.
33, Michigan Salt Works v. Baird (1913) 173 Mich. 655, and other like cases,
were all similar in this respect. In each, the act for which the prosecution
was feared had been committed, and the injunction was employed as a protection against a presently possible prosecution.
But let it be supposed that the case is one where no violation of the
statute has taken place and where none is contemplated until after the court
has passed upon its validity. Is there anything to enjoin? The attorney
general cannot prosecute because nothing has been done upon which to base a
prosecution. Can the attorney general be enjoined from prosecuting before
any violation or even threat of violation has occurred?
In Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co. (1920) 2u Mich. 592, an effort was
made to obtain a decision from the court as to whether a contract could
legally be made which the plaintiff alleged that he was desirous of making.
The plaintiff feared the penalties of a statute. He had no intention of entering into the proposed 1=ontract unless he was first assured by the court that he
would not be liable for the penalty. He asked for a declaration of rights,
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and got it, but the supreme court held
that at this stage there was no controversy pending, and that the declaration
was only a decision on a moot question and therefore invalid. Apparently it
was the view of the supreme court of Michigan that until the plaintiff did
some act upon which the penal statute could operate, there could be no judicial question. In this view of the proceedings the addition of a prayer for an
injunction against the attorney general would have added nothing to the
substance of the case, for no prosecution was possible because there was no
violation of the statute, either actual or threatened. The infirmity in the
case was held to go much deeper than a mere procedural failure to add a
suitable prayer. The court held that there was no cause of action in existence
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which could be employed by the plaintiff in a court of justice.
A case identical on its facts with the Anway Case has just been decided
by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington,
three judges sitting and concurring. Terrace v. Thompson (1921) 274 Fed.
841. In that case the owners of certain land wished to lease it to a Japanese.
A statute known as the Alien Land Bill in terms prohibited such a lease under
heavy penalties, but the parties believed the apparent prohibition was not
legally effective. They were not willing, however, to make the lease unless
the court first assured them that it could safely be done, and they joined as
complainants in a bill in equity, making the attorney general a party defendant, and ·asked for an injunction restraining the defendant from prosecuting
under the statute. The court cited Ex parte Young, supra, as authority for
taking jurisdiction, and the rights of the parties were determined. As in the
A11way Case, no act had been done by the complainants contrary to the statute.
No prosecution was therefore possible, and the complainants made it clear
in their bill that they did not propose to render themselves liable to any
prosecution. The attorney general was therefore enjoined from an impossibility, viz., from suing on a cause of action which not only did not exist but
was not threatened or even contemplated. The injunction was therefore
essentially premature, and apparently served only as a cloak to hide a mere
declaration of rights. The court held that where parties contemplate entering in_to a contract which may or may not amount to a violation of a penal
statute, the court will, in advance of any act on their part which could be
deemed wrongful, pass upon their rights and tell them whether their contemplated action will or will not be a violation of the act. This is a pure
declaration of rights, and it was made in this case as an exercise of inherent
judicial power, without any authorizing statute.
E. R. S.
JOINT fiNANCY IN PSRSONAI, PROPimTY IN MICHIGAN-In

Lober v. Dorgan,

215 Mich. 62, decided July 19, I92I, the court again wrestled with the problem
which has troubled the Michigan courts for many years, as to whether the
law of the state recognizes any such thing as joint ownership in personal
property with the common law incident of survivorship. The facts presented
a controversy between the estates of husband and wife, the latter having survived the former. A real estate mortgage had been given to "George W. Bush
and Sarah Bush, his wife, of Gobleville, Michigan, as joint tenants, with sole
right to the survivor." After the husband's death Mrs. Bush collected part
of the sum due and the suit was for an accounting as to the sum so collected.
It was held, Steere, C. J., and Fellows and Stone, JJ., dissenting, that Mrs.
Bush by right of survivorship was entitled 'to the whole sum.
In arriving at this conclusion it was necessary for the majority either to
repudiate Ludwig v. Bruner, 203 Mich. 556 (I918), or to distinguish it. The
latter course was taken, and the distinction in facts seized upon was the presence in the Lober case mortgage of the words "with the sole right to the survivor." In the principal case Bird, J., does not go so far as to say that a joint
tenancy in personal property with the common law incident of survivorship
may be created in Michigan; ·he merely holds that the parties to the mortgage
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may by contract provide for survivorship. Whatever may be thought of the
basic question regarding joint tenancy in personal property with its common
law incidents, it is believed that the learned court in its decision puts itself
upon very dubious ground.
In the first place, the kinds of estates and tenancies which parties are
allowed to create is not merely a matter of the parties' freedom of contract.
The types of estates and tenancies which the law will recognize are few and
in a sense arbitrary. For example, no court would give literal effect to a
conveyance "to A and his male heirs," no matter how clearly the desire of the
parties to the deed to have such estate may have been expressed. The common
law recognized inheritable estates only as fees simple or fees tail. The example
proposed is neither, and the construction of such limitation would be merely
to eliminate the word "male." And it is of course common knowledge that
within any particular class of estates there were distinct common law limitations upon the parties' freedom. The Rule against Perpetuities has interfered many times with the plans of grantors and devisors. For its conclusion
regarding the freedom and potency of contract to provide for survivorship
the court relies largely on Equitable Loaii and Sernrity Co. v. Waring, II7 Ga.
599, in which the court was considering whether an investment certificate
scheme involving certain features of lapse and survivorship was illegal as a
lottery. Taylor v. Smith, II6 N. C. 531, quoted from in the Georgia case,
merely decided that co-owners of a note could make a valid contract that on
the death of either without issue the note should belong to the survivor. And
Arnold v. lac.k's Ex'rs. 24 Pa. St. 57, also relied upon in the Georgia case, decided that it was possible to limit an estate in land to two or more for life as
co-owners with cross remainders to the survivor.
The only possible support for the conclusions of the majority would seem
to be in the possibility of treating the words "with sole right to the survivor"
as creating an interest in the mortgage in the nature of, a remainder. It is
possible that Bird, J., had this in mind in speaking of freedom of contract.
Whether the quoted words are sufficient to create a future interest in personal property is, it is submitted, extremely doubtful. It would be questionable
whether they would be effective to create a remainder even in the case of real
property.
In Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425, there was announced a decision which
fairly warranted the statement thereafter frequently made by the court that
"under our decisions the right of survivorship does not obtain in personal
property held in joint ownership." Hart v. Hart, 201 Mich. 207, 213 (1918),
in which Bird and Kuhn, JJ., dissented from the proposition quoted. The
decision of the case, however, was neither an affirmance nor rejection of the
view. Later in the same year in the Ludwig case, supra, Ostrander, C. J.,
and Steere, Stone, and Kuhn, JJ., concurred with Mr. Justice Fellows in
application of the doctrine of Wait v. Bovee. Bird, Moore, and Brook, JJ.,
'dissented, claiming that the law would recognize joint tenancy with right of
survivorship in personal property if provided for by the parties. In the
principal case the new members of the court, Wiest, Clark, and Sharpe, JJ.,
joined Bird and Moore, JJ., in the view expressed by the former in his dis-
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senting opinion in the Ludwig case. Steere, C. J., and Stone, and Fellows,
JJ., adhered to what had been their prevailing view in the earlier case, namely,
that survivorship in joint ownership of personal property would not be recognized even though the parties make it clear that they intend such incident to
attach.
The decision in the principal case purports, according to the prevailing
opinion, to be entirely consistent with the earlier cases in the State. It is,
however, a rejection of the view announced in the court's opinion in the
L11dwig case that the quality of survivorship can not be attached by an expression of intention to that effect. In dealing with this question Michigan
lawyers must address themselves to this inquiry: have the parties contracted
for the incident of survivorship? According to the Ludwig case no such contract or intention is shown by a provision in the instrument of title that the
co-owners are to hold "as joint tenants." But if there are added the words
"with sole right to the survivor," then, according to the principal case, there
is joint tenancy as at common law so far as survivorship is concerned.
There remains to be said only that at common law joint tenancy was
applicable to personal as well as real property. LITT. 28r; Co. LITT., r8:za;
2 KENT'S COMM.* 350. An early exception was made as to the incident of
survivorship in the case of property used in trade or agriculture. 2 KsN't's
COMM., *350. And the same general policy against joint tenancies in realty
has found some expression in the case of personalty. ScHouum, PEits. PRoP.
§ r56. The public policy of the State of Michigan regarding this matter is
perhaps indicated in part at least by COMP. LAWS OF r9r5, sec. 8040, wherein
it is provided that deposits in bank in the name of the depositor or any other
person, "and in form to be paid to either or the survivor" thereby become the
property of such persons "as joint tenants," with right of survivorship. This
statute which is a copy of a New York Act was held valid in In re Rehfeld!s
Est., r98 Mich. 249.
R. W. A.
Powim oF A CouR't TO PUNISH WHEN Tm~ PRESCRIBED PuNISHll!EN't BECOMES l111Possrnr.E-"lt is to be noted, that penal statutes are taken strictly
and literally only in the point of defining and setting down the fact and the
punishment, and in those clauses that do concern them, and not generally in
words that are but circumstances and conveyance in the putting of the case,
and so see the diversity; for if the law be, that for such an offense a man shall
lose his right hand, and the offender hath had his right hand before cut off in
the wars, he shall not lose his left hand, but the crime shall rather pass without the punishment which the law assigned, than the letter of the law should
be extended."-BACON's LAW TRACTS, 75.
The legislature of Washington in r9r9 provided for the creation of a penal
institution for women and appropriated funds for its maintenance during the
ensuing biennium. The act provided that all women over r6 years of age
might be and all women over 18· years of age mttst be, confined in this institution when convicted of any gross misdemeanor or of any felony except
murder, arson, or robbery. At its biennial session in r92r, the legislature
passed an appropriation bill for the maintenance of this institution for
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another two years but this bill was vetoed by the governor after the legislature had adjourned. The institution was closed April l, 1!)21, for want of
funds. One week later, the defendant was convicted of the crime of adultery.
The lower court committed her to this institution but, there being no way of
carrying the committment into effect, the woman was held in the coilnty jail.
On an original application to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus
seeking her discharge from custody, a majority of the court held that the
failure of the legislature to make an appropriation for the institution in 19~1
effected a repeal of the Act of 1919; that this exception to the prior law being
now repealed, the prior law would be fully operative and she should be
sentenced as provided in this prior law. E~ parte Williamson (Wash. 1921),
200 Pac. 329.
Admitting that the Act of 1919 was repealed and that this act was only an
exception to the prior law as to felonies and misdemeanors, then the decision
-that the exception being taken away, the prior statute is to be applied without the exception-is sound. 25 R. c. r,. 934; Manchester Township SuP'•rvisors v. Wayne Co. Comm., 257 Pa. 442.
But di~ the majority of the court come to the right conclusion when they
held that failure by the legislature to make an appropriation for the institution effected a repeal of the law requiring offenders to be confined in that
institution? Certainly the legislature did not intend that law to be repealed,
for before adjournment it passed an appropriation measure for the institution.
True, ·the governor vetoed the appropriation measure, but could that operate
as a repeal of prior legislation? The three dissenting judges a111swered that
question by saying: "While admitting the governor's power to veto an appropriation, I cannot consent to the idea that, by such a veto, the governor
can, in effect, repeal prior, properly enacted, positive, statutory provisions for
the punishment of crime."
If then the Act of 1919 was still in force, we have a case of one convicted
under a statute where the prescribed mandatory punishment has become impossible of being enforced.
An analogy to this state of facts might be drawn from the case of United
States v. Union Supply Company, 215 U. S. 50. In that case a corporation was
proceeded against criminally for an offense punishable under the statute by
fine and imprisonment. The corporation clearly could not be subjected to the
imprisonment. It was held that when a statute prescribes that two independent penalties shall both be inflicted, the inference is that the legislature
intended them to be inflicted as far as possible, and that, if one of them is
impossible, the legislature did not intend on that account that the defendant
should escape. Upon conviction the defendant corporation was subjected to
a fine only. In the principal case, the whole penalty has become impossible of
enforcement, but, applying the analogy, we would say that, although the
punishment stipulated has become impossible, still the legislature did not
intend on that account that the offender shoµld go free, and it merely results
in a law which prohibits certains acts but provides no penalty. Does a court
then have power to punish one who violates such a statute? The common
law rule in such a case is that "wherever a statute prohibits a matter of public
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grievance to the liberty and security of the people, or commands a matter of
public convenience, without enacting any penalty for disobeying its prohibitions or commands, an offender against such a statute is punishable by way
of indictment for his contempt of its enactments, and may be sentenced to
pay a fine for his offense." State v. Fletcher, 5 N. H. 257. Under such a rule,
the court should have sustained the habeas corpus proceedings in the principal
case, but the defendant could then have been indicted under the common law
for her contempt of the enactment. But in a state where the common law is
not in force and this common law indictmertt therefore not available, the
court has no inherent power to punish one who violates a statute for which
no penalty is provided and the result is that the offender goes free. State v.
Ga11nt, 13 Ore. n5.
Again, in a jurisdiction where the court will look behind the words of the
statute to the intent of the legislature, one might suggest that, rather than
construe the two statutes as together prohibiting the act but providing no
enforcible penalty, the court should construe the later statute by reading into
it the additional words: "so long as this i11stit11tio1~ shall be maintained, women over 18 years of age must be confined therein." With this interpretation,
the former law would become operative as soon as the institution was closed.
But these words should not properly be read into the statute. At first glance,
it would seem to be analogous to the case where the statute prohibits selling
liquor to a minor. The defendant sells to the minor not knowing he is a
minor. The court feels that the legislature did not intend such a defendant
to come within the statute and so reads the word "knowingly" in the statute.
Adler v. State, 55 Ala. 16. But it is to be noted that in that case, reading the
additional word into the statute resulted in favor of the offender while reading
the suggested words into the statute of the principal case would result to the
disadvantage of the defendant. The better rule is that "the benefit of the
doubt should be given to the subject, and against the legislature which has
failed to explain itself." MAxwnr, on INTERPRETATION OF S~ATUTES (5th Ed.),
p. 460.

Many courts. however, refuse to look for a legislative intent as to punishment when the prescribed mandatory punishment fails, for here the court is
confronted with one of those cases where the legislature had no intent-where
the court is called upon to guess what the legislature would have intended if
the question had been brought to its mind. These courts follow the rule, as
laid down by Bacon, supra, that "penal statutes are taken strictly and literally
in the point of setting down the fact and the punishment" and "the crime shall
rather pass without the punishment which the law assigned rather than the
letter of the law should be extended." In Weems v. United States, 217 U. S.
349, the defendant was convicted of defrauding the United States Government
of the Philippine Islands and was sentenced in accordance with the requirements of the statute. On appeal, the mandatory penalty was held unconstitutional as being a cruel and unusual punishment. The court there did not say
that the evident intent of the legislature was that a defrauder of the government should be punished and, if the prescribed punishment failed, the court
might substitute some other punishment. On the contrary, it said the case
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could not be remanded for new sentence but the judgment must be reversed
with directions to dismiss the proceedings. This, of course, would result in
the defendant going free, but these courts hold that the fault is in the statute
and it rests with the legislature to make the alteration. As was said by Lord
Tenterden in Rex v. Barham, 8 B. & C. 104; "Our decision may perhaps
operate to defeat the object of the statute; but it is better to abide by this
consequence than to put upon it a construction not warranted by the words of
the act in order to give effect to what we may suppose to be the intention of
the legislature."
·
L. W. K.
PUBLIC UTILrrms-RATEs F1xED BY MUNICIPALITY UNDER Pow.ER To R.EGuLATE AND F1x RATES-The principal cases dealing with the power of municipalities to contract with public service companies for service rates, and of the
legislature to override such contract rates, have been considered in 19 MICHIGAN LAW RIM::e:w 886 and previous notes· there referred to. The rules of law
have been gradually evolved, with results full of surprises to the public and to
the companies. The latter felt the first painful jar in what may fairly be called
the leading case in this field, Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 2II U. S.
265. In the more recent cases it has in general been the public that has suffered pain. Neither side has accepted punishment very gracefully, and th~ contest has not helped to develop that good feeling between them that is so desirable if the utility company is to prosper and the public is to be well and
reasonably served. It is not the purpose of this note to refer to all of the
many very recent cases as few of them make any material contribution to the
subject, and these few have been considered in previous notes.
The attempt will be rather to try to state clearly such results as seem
settled. That there is still room for such clear statement seems the more
evident from the fact that judges continue to mis-apply the law in cases
which seem so evidently governed by previous decisions that one would think
that not even lawyers would argue to the contrary. Neither side seems
willing to accept those results, and both continue to make contention of
points which should be taken as settled unless and until the decisions are
changed by statutes or constitutions. Not all the cases, of course, are so
clear, but for the doubtful, clear distinctions are of great value. The doubt
now rests mainly, not wholly, in the application, rather than in the statement
of principles.
·
It is to be remarked on this whole matter that usually the golden rule
would work better for both parties than any rules of law, but past experiences have bred so much suspicion as to the truthfulness and good faith of
the parties, and left so much antagonism, that the public, remembering perhaps the insistence of corporations on the unreasonable advantages of
franchise provisions obtained sometimes by false tampering with the representatives of the people, is now in most cases unwilling to release the corporations from any franchise provisions in its favor, even in cases where
rates have become unremunerative, and involve the bankruptcy of the corporations. Perhaps this unwillinguess to permit any increase in rates is because
the public believes no claim made by the corporations, but certainly it can
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never be well served by a corporation that is performing service at a loss.
Some corporations have avoided the storm by taking the public into confidence
and showing the actual condition, and many seem to be appreciating at nearer
its par value the good will and confidence of the customers of a public utility.
Certain principles are too well settled to call for further citation of cases.
In former notes (see 19 MICHIGAN LAW Rsvx:ew 886), the leading cases have
been discussed determining, (1) That the legislature, or the constitution, may
confer on the municipality power to contract with its public service companies. (2) That such grant of power is not to be implied from general power
to grant fra'nchises, or to license use of the streets. (3) That when power to
contract has been conferred on the municipality, any contract so made, though
binding like any contract until modified or set aside by agreement of the
parties, is after all a contract between the state and the company, and is
therefore subject to the reserved right of the state in its police power, acting
through the legislature or a commission clothed with such authority by the
legislature, to revoke or modify the agreement without the consent of the
municipality. Whether it is possible for the legislature so far to put off its
function of acting for the state in the exercise of this sovereign power that it
can confer upon a municipality power to contract in such manner that the
legislature cannot later set aside agreements made by the city is not clear.
State v. Ka11sas City Gas Co. 254 Mo. 515, 534. Cf. 18 MICHIGAN LAW Rsvnw,
8o7. There is objection to the idea that any sovereign power can be irrevocably granted away by the legislature. Constitutional grants of course are
not subject to recall by the legislature, or review by a commission. Link v.
Public Utilities Com. (Ohio 192I) 13I N. 'E. 7g6.
That the public is far from satisfied is shown by the number of cases
that continue to come up to the courts of last resort under a persistent claim
that the legislature, or more often a commission, cannot set aside a rate fixed
in a franchise granted by the city or in an ordinance passed by the city under
its assumed power to control rates for public utilities. As stated above there
may be a few cases where the power granted the municipality is irrevocable,
but in nearly all cases this contention of the city is futile. City Water Co. v.
City of Sedalia (Mo. 1021) 231 S. W. 042, Citv of Bartlesville v. Corporation
Comm. (Okla. 1921) IQQ Pac. 3Q6. The interestlng problems in recent cases
usually involve another question, viz. whether the rate fixed is a regulation of
rates, or a matter of contract. If the latter, it is binding though it may prove
confiscatory; if the former, it must be remunerative or it takes property without due process. Such a rate, which has become unremunerative, is not
binding on the company, even though the franchise was granted on the express condition that service should be furnished at the rates named in the
franchise.
Here we may state three more settled rules. I. Power in a city charter
"to regulate charges" is no authority to enter into a contract to abandon such
power to regulate. Any rate fi..'Ced by a city having such charter power may
be lowered by the city, and, we are now learning, raised by the company,
whenever it ceases to be a reasonable rate for the service. Home Telephone
Co. v. Los Angeles, 2II U. S. 265. 2. The same rule applies when the city is
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given power to regulate and fix rates under a provision that "these powers
shall not be abridged by ordinance, resolution or contract." Southern Iowa
Electric Co. v. Chariton, 41 Sup. Ct. 400. To allow a city to fix by a contract
irrevocable for the franchise period the rates for service would be to abridge
the power to regulate and fix the rates. And yet the district court of the
United States in a recent case decided contra, perhaps because the above
Supreme Court decision had not then been rendered. The Court of Appeals
later held that the case was settled by the Charito1i case, supra. Central
Power Co. v. City of Kearney, 274 Fed. 253, (July 13, 1921). The city having
power to regulate down the rate fixed, it followed that the company may
regulate up, on a showing that the rate is not remunerative. Such a rate
cannot be a contract rate binding the company, for the reason that it does
not reciprocally bind the city. 3. The same thing follows where the city's
grant of power over rates is under a provision in the Constitution of the
state, to the effect that the "power to regulate rates shall not be surrendered,"
City of Bartlesville v. Corporation Comm. (Okla. 1921), 199 Pac. 396, or prohibiting "any irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges," etc.
City of Saii Antoni<F v. Pieblic Service Co. 41 Sup. Ct. 428. In view of this
decision of the Supreme Court on April II, 1921, it is surprising to find the
district judge in Water, Light and Power Co. v. City of Hot Springs, S. D.
274 Fed. 827, decided July 13, 1921, the same day as the City of Kearney case,
s11pra1 holding that under such a constitutional inhibition against irrevocable
grants a power "to regulate the distribution, sale and use of gas or other illuminative liquids" could fairly be inferred from the general powers given to
cities by the South Dakota Statutes, and that such a power gave the city a
right to enter into a binding contract for a rate irrevocable during the franchise
period, but not any right of future control. It may well be doubted first
whether the general language of the statutes gave cities any power to contract;
second whether a power to regulate sale if specifically given includes a power
to contract; and third whether under the constitutional provision against irrevocability the statutes could give any power to contract for such a fixed
rate. As in the Kearney case the district judge was overruled by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, so here it would seem the same fate must overtake the
decision of the district judge.

E. C.G.

